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European Central Bank working paper series 44Abstract
This paper investigates a dynamic general equilibrium model with search. In particular, search externali-
ties are re￿ected by an increasing returns to scale matching function, which may imply an indeterminate
equilibrium. Hence, the model is capable to generate business ￿uctuations, driven by self-ful￿lling belief,
characterised by unemployment persistence. A numerical simulation shows that the degree of externalities
needed for indeterminacy is not too far from existing empirical estimates and the implied dynamics of
employment is richer then that of standard RBC models with search.
Keywords: Search Theory, Matching Function, Indeterminacy, General Equilibrium.
JEL Classi￿cation: E10, E24, J64
ECB • Working Paper No 271 • September 2003 4Non-technical summary
The macroeconomic literature on dynamic stochatinc general equilibrium models displaying
indeterminacy relies on some assumptions that are not widely recognized as plausible. In par-
ticular, the production function is assumed to display large increasing returns to scale, due to
either monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods market or externalities in the produc-
tion process. Moreover, the labor market is considered to be competitive (among other features
unemployment is ignored) and characterized by both labor supply and demand schedules either
upward sloping or downward sloping. However, empirical evidence shows economies with high
and persistent unemployment rates coupled with rigid wages: labor costs do not move enough to
restore the equilibrium and unemployment is the natural consequence. One way to cope with this
theoretical puzzle is to consider departures from the Walrasian model of the labor market. Among
the diﬀerent non-Walrasian models, search theory has attracted great attention in the profession
This paper analyses the possibility of indeterminacy in a general equilibrium model, once
the labor market is described according to search theory. In details, the model presented can
be associated with indeterminate dynamics, when labor market externalities are explicitly taken
into account and eventually determine an increasing returns to scale matching function. The
source of indeterminacy, however, is diﬀerent from existing studies: it is not related to distortions
introduced by institutions bur, rather, to peculiar features of the labor market. In particular, if
the probability of a representative ￿rm ￿nding an agent of the opposite side is diﬀerent from the
￿social￿ probability of a vacancy being ￿lled, the model may display indeterminacy for diﬀerent
values of the externality parameters.
ECB • Working Paper No 271 • September 2003 5The model derived in the paper is rather simple. Nevertheless, it is able to produce a series
of interesting results and insights. In particular, using a matching function which incorporates
externalities, displaying increasing returns to scale, and solving a (pseudo) social planner prob-
lem, the model is capable to generate indeterminacy for plausible values in the parameter space.
Moreover, such a result can be derived by looking at a decentralized version of the model in which
the representative household runs a ￿rm hiring workers and at the same time supplies jobs to
other ￿rms. In this case the wage equation is determined outside the maximization problem using
a Nash Bargaining solution. Finally, a symple simulation of the model shows that the increas-
ing returns in the matching function matter for the dynamics of employment when the steady
state equilibrium is perturbed by a shock: the underlined dynamics is richer and displays more
persistency than that of standard RBC models with search.
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A number of economists have studied economies characterized by a multiplicity of equilibria in
which fundamentals are unable to pin down a determinate equilibrium1 : a path toward the stable
steady state could be ￿nd only taking into account ￿animal spirits￿ or self-ful￿lling belief. Once
this class of models has been calibrated to match US data, it is able to explain not only the
contemporaneous correlations of output, consumption, and investment (as standard RBC models)
but is also able to successfully capture the dynamics of the data (Farmer and Guo, 1994), exhibiting
a realistic degree of persistence.
However, the literature of indeterminacy relies on some assumptions that are not widely recog-
nized as plausible. First, the production function is assumed to display increasing returns to scale,
due to either monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods market or externalities in the
production process. In particular, the degree of increasing returns needed for indeterminacy seems
to be too high compared to microeconometrics studies. Second, in order to reconcile increasing
returns with competitive behavior, the ￿private￿ production function is assumed to be homoge-
neous of degree one while the ￿social￿ production function is characterized by increasing returns.
Third, the labor market is considered to be competitive (among other features unemployment is
ignored) and characterized by both labor supply and demand schedules either upward sloping or
downward sloping.
With regard to the labor market, empirical evidence shows economies with high and persistent
unemployment rates coupled with rigid wages: labor costs do not move enough to restore the
equilibrium and unemployment is the natural consequence. One way to cope with this theoretical
puzzle is to consider departures from the Walrasian model of the labor market. Among the
diﬀerent non-Walrasian models, search theory has attracted great attention in the profession.
Despite the fact that search theory has generated many partial equilibrium models, few at-
1 See among others Howitt and McAfee (1988, 1992), Kehoe et al. (1992), Farmer (1993), Benhabib and Farmer
(1994).
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and Prescott real business cycle model. Monika Merz (1995) and David Andolfatto (1996) were
among the ￿rst to successfully integrate search theory into otherwise standard dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models. In particular, they were able to reproduce standard macro variable
￿uctuations as well as previously neglected movements in employment, unemployment and va-
cancies. Moreover, diﬀerences between real wages and labor productivity are clearly taken into
account and the dynamics of the variables considered is richer than in standard RBC models with
a competitive labour market.
In a recent paper, Burda and Weder (2000) brought together both indeterminacy and real
business cycle models with a non-Walrasian labor market. They showed how a dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium model with search exhibits more output persistence than standard
RBC models and may display indeterminacy of rational expectation paths for plausible parameter
values. Although their ￿ndings can be derived assuming constant returns to scale for both the
production function and the matching function, the results depend critically on distortions in the
labor market introduced by institutions (e.g. payroll taxation and unemployment bene￿ts).
The present paper analyses the possibility of indeterminacy in a general equilibrium model,
once the labor market is described according to search theory. In detail, it is my intention to show
that models like those of Andolfatto and Merz can be associated with indeterminate dynamics,
when labor market externalities are explicitly taken into account and eventually determine an
increasing returns to scale matching function. The source of indeterminacy is diﬀerent from that
of Burda and Weder(2000): while their results hinge on distortions introduced by institutions, my
analysis focusses on peculiar features of the labor market. In particular, if the probability of a
representative ￿rm ￿nding an agent of the opposite side is diﬀerent from the ￿social￿ probability of
a vacancy being ￿lled, the model may display indeterminacy for diﬀerent values of the externality
parameters.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, I brie￿y present the achievements and
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matching function, is introduced and discussed. Section 4 is devoted to showing the conditions
under which a simple dynamic general equilibrium model displays indeterminacy with special
emphasis on the labor market features necessary to obtain such a result. In particular, using a
matching function with increasing returns to scale a theoretical condition for indeterminacy is
found. The same result is demonstrated to arise in the decentralized version of the model in which
￿rms and workers decisions are taken separately (section 5). In the following section a numerical
exercise is performed and the theoretical condition for indeterminacy is veri￿ed by data simulation.
Finally, a review of empirical studies of the matching function and a discussion on the plausibility
of the parameter values chosen characterizes section 7. Section 8 concludes, discussing some issues
for future research.
2 Related Literature
In this section, I introduce the main features and shortcomings of the indeterminacy literature
with a particular emphasis on the labor market characteristics implied by this class of models.
Moreover, it is my intention to show that the assumptions concerning the labor market are crucial
in obtaining an indeterminate equilibrium path in the studies reviewed below.
In a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, Benhabib and Farmer (1994)
￿nd that the equilibrium is indeterminate once the production function is assumed to display
increasing returns to scale and its parameters are chosen in a particular range of values. Notably,
they interpret the theoretical condition for indeterminacy as a peculiar parametrization of labor
demand and labor supply. For instance, this condition can be read as a requirement for the slope
of the labor demand curve to be positive and steeper than labor supply (Picture 1). Although
this eclectic parametrization of labor demand and supply generates indeterminacy and it is able
to replicate US data features better than a standard RBC model (Farmer and Guo, 1994), it has




Figure 1: Labor demand and labor supply slope up
been criticized as being implausible by a number of authors.2 Moreover, the required degree of
imcreasing returns to scale in production has been found at odds with recent emprirical studies
(Basu and Fernald, 1997)
In a more recent paper, Benhabib and Farmer (2000) try to explain the real eﬀects of money
(the so-called monetary transmission mechanism) by using a dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium model in which real balances have been introduced into a standard production function.
In particular, they show that rational expectations are not suﬃcient to pin down a particular
equilibrium, indeterminacy arises and, therefore, the monetary transmission mechanism can be
explained by agents￿ self-ful￿lling expectations. In details, agents in the real world resolve the
indeterminacy problem by coordinating on a particular equilibrium that has the property that
prices are predetermined one period in advance. Empirically, the model is able to ￿tr e a ld a t a
for particular values of the preference parameters. However, the parametrization chosen implies
a labor supply curve with a negative slope, albeit derived from a market equilibrium condition
2 See for example Aiyagari (1995).




Figure 2: Labor demand and labor supply slope down
(Figure 2). As in the previous case (upward sloping labor demand and supply), the implications
of the parameters choice appear too eclectic and not widely accepted. In conclusion, although
downward sloping labour demand and supply schedules are able to reproduce aggregate phenom-
enon such as the procyclicality of employment, their foundation are at odds with microeconomics
studies of the labor market.
In order to overcome the non standard implications of the indeterminacy condition on labor
supply and demand, Bennett and Farmer (2000) generalize the results found in Benhabib and
Farmer (1994) by using a model with a Walrasian labor market and preferences that are non
separable in consumption and leisure. Their main ￿ndings are that the degree of increasing
returns to scale in production needed for indeterminacy is lower than that of previous studies, and
that the condition for indeterminacy found does not imply labor demand and supply schedules
with ￿wrong￿ slopes. In particular, labor demand slopes down and the (constant-consumption)
labor supply slopes up. However, the parametrization of their model triggers a diﬀerence between
the constant-consumprion and the Frisch labor supply curves, where the Frish labor supply curve
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even if the constant-consumption labor supply slopes up, Frisch labor supply curve is downward
sloping and crosses labour demand with the ￿wrong￿ slope.
The studies reviewed above reveal that general equilibrium models displaying indeterminacy are
able to capture some key featuers of actual data such as their dynamics and degree of persistency.
However, indeterminancy conditions hinge on peculiar features of the labor market which are
not always supported by empirical evidence. Moreover, a common charasteristic of the models
presented is the assumption of a competitive labor market which is always maintained. In the
rest of the paper I will relax such an assumption. In particular, in order to provide a plausible
foundation for indeterminacy in simple general equilibrium models, it is my intention to take into
account frictions and externalities arising in the labor market.
3 Search Theory and the Matching Technology
In the standard neo-classical theory, all markets are competitive and agents￿ decisions are co-
ordinated by prices. In particular, wages move instantaneously in order to keep labor demand
and labor supply in balance. Therefore unemployment, if exists, it is only temporary. Empirical
evidence, however, shows economies with high unemployment rates and rigid wages. In other
words, wages do not move enough to restore the equilibrium and unemployment is the natural
consequence.
One way to take these features into account is to consider departures from the Walrasian
model of the labor market. Among the diﬀerent non-Walrasian models, I consider here the so
called search theory. Originated by the Phelps volume (1970), search theory has been developed
by many economists in the 1980s and in the 1990s.3
Unlike the frictionless labor market, workers and ￿rms are heterogeneous and meet in a one-
to-one fashion, in a decentralized labor market. The process of matching up workers and ￿rms,
3 In particular see Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Pissarides (1990), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
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in which diﬀerent kinds of externalities arise. Indeed, the number of new matches depends crucially
on the relative number of agents in the two sides of the market (labor market tightness) as well as
on their eﬀorts in searching and recruiting. In particular, for a given agent, a positive externality
arises if the number of the agents in the other side of the market increases. On the other hand, a
negative externality is related to the increasing number of agents in the same side of the market
(congestion).
The simplest matching function  = (••) describes the job creation ￿ow and depends on
vacant jobs posted by ￿rms ( ) and the number of unemployed workers (1 − ):
 = (1 − )
The matching technology above, like a production technology, describes a relationship between
inputs (vacancies and unemployment) and output (￿ow rate at which workers and vacant jobs form
new job-worker matches)4 .
In the standard search literature the matching function (••) is assumed homogeneous of
degree one (constant return to scale)5 , non decreasing and concave. In particular, given the
matching function properties, the probability of a vacant job being ￿lled and the probability of













4 Note that the aggregate labor force has been normalized to 1.
5 Blanchard and Diamond (1989) for the US and Pissarides (1986a) for the Unitd Kingdom have estimated
constant return to scale matching functions.






Note that, given the probabilities () and (), the duration of unemployment is equal to
1() and the duration of a vacancy is equal to 1().
The probabilities above can help to understand the externalities displayed by a search model.
The probability for an unemployed worker to ￿nd a job, (), decreases with congestion caused
by an increase in unemployment (1 − ) and increases in market thickness represented by an
increase in the number of posted vacancies. The reverse is true for (), the probability of a
match for a vacant job.
In what follows I will move from the standard assumptions above, by taking into account
that the externalities implied by a matching technology may lead, eventually, to an increasing
returns to scale matching function, an hypothesis which has gained a large empirical support in
the literature6 . Moreover it is worth analyzing the eﬀect of this departure from the mainstream in
looking at the dynamics and the propagation mechanism of a general equilibrium model in which
those features are explicitly taken into account. One way to introduce an IRS matching function
into a standard RBC model is by using arguments similar to those used in the indeterminacy
literature for production technologies. In particular, a representative worker and a representative
￿rm face a constant return to scale matching function of the following form:
 = 	 (1 − ) (1)
where 
 +  =1and 	0 is a shifting parameter.
Representative agents consider the aggregate shift parameter 	 as given, exogenous to their
decisions. However 	 is determined by the activities of other agents in the economy. In particular
6 The issue will be discussed in section 7.
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	 = 
−
(1 − )− (2)
where 
 ≥ 
,  ≥ ,  and 1 −  represent the economic-wide levels of vacancies and un￿lled
jobs, and 
 +  ≥ 1.
The economy is assumed to be populated by an in￿nite number of ￿rms and workers such
that representative agents consider the two quantities above as given, however, recognizing that
in equilibrium  =  and 1− =1−, the ￿private￿ matching function (1) can be transformed
into the following ￿social￿ matching function:
 =  (1 − ) (3)
When 
 + 1, the matching function described by (3) displays increasing returns to scale.
In other words, representative agents face a CRS function (1) while in aggregate, the ￿social￿
matching function exhibits increasing returns to scale (3).
The economic intuition for introducing the externality in the search framework in the same way
it has been done for production technologies elsewhere can be explained by using labour market
segmentation arguments. Agents, in making their decisions, look at what surrounds them without
t a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h ee ﬀects of labour market conditions prevaling in the overall economy.
For instance, a ￿rm operating in a de￿ned geographical area would look at the labour market
conditions in that area without considering neither the eﬀect of its decision on neighboring areas
nor the eﬀects of labour market condition of other areas in the region it. However, what matters
for the economy-wide matching technology are the conditions in the entire economy and not only
those prevailing in a speci￿ca r e a .
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In this section, I brie￿y describe the preferences of the representative consumer, the production
technology, the aggregate employment evolution and the maximization problem set up. In the
next subsections the solution of the problem is found and the dynamics of the system around the
steady state discussed.
The representative consumer derives his utility only from consumption () and preferences
are described by a logarithmic function such that the instantaneous utility is speci￿ed as:
 ()=l o g (4)
The production technology is assumed to display constant returns to scale and depending only
on labor, in other words output is linear in labor:
 =  ()= (5)
In this economy capital plays no role and aggregate output is entirely consumed. Hence, the
aggregate resource constraint of the economy reduces to:
 = 
The standard frictionless Walrasian labor market is replaced by one that can be described
using a simple search and matching model, in which externalities are explicitly taken to account
and eventually increasing returns to scale in matching matter. The labor market considered here
is characterized by a continuous ￿ow of people from employment to unemployment ad vice versa.
ECB • Working Paper No 271 • September 2003 16Even in the steady state, when employment is constant, people moves in opposite directions (in
this case in￿ows match exactly out￿ows).
Job destruction (out￿ows from employment) is an exogenous process determined by the sepa-
ration rate . On the other hand, the job creation process is summarised by the matching function
(1) described above. In order to focus only on movements between employment and unemploy-
ment, and not in and out the labour force the assumption  =
_
 =1is imposed. Therefore, the
dynamics of employment is given by:7
•
 =  −  (6)
The maximization problem of the economy described above can be solved using the social
planner paradigm, even if it is not going to give the ￿rst best solution. As a matter of fact in
what follows the social planner behaves myopically: he does not recognize the external eﬀect of
choosing a determinate level of vacancies (or the eﬀect of choosing diﬀerent amount of resources
devoted to recruitment activities). In other words, he considers  and 1− as given, as external
to his problem.




where  is the discount rate and  is the instantaneous utility function de￿n e di n( 4 ) .I ft h e
production function is linear in labor (5) and the entire output is consumed, the ￿pseudo￿ social





− [log −  ] (7)
7 The variables depend on time. We do not write time dependence to avoid heavy notation.
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Note that the social planner takes into account the cost of posting a vacancy for the represen-
tative ￿rm and such a cost (normalised to the number of vacancies) is expressed in utility units.
The choice of introducing the cost of posting a vacancy as a utility cost simpli￿es the analysis
and, given the capital is absent in the model, it does not in￿uence the result.
4.1 Problem￿s Solution
The present value Hamiltonian of the (pseudo) social planner problem can be summarized by the
following expression:
 =l o g −  + Λ[ − ] (8)
where Λ represents the co-state variable.






The derivative with respect the co-state gives the expression for the employment dynamics:
•
 =  −  (10)
and along the optimal path the shadow value of labor has to satisfy the following rule:
•







Finally, the transversality condition of the problem is given by:
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→∞−Λ()=0 (12)
In order to analyze in a clearer way the dynamic of the solution, it is useful to divide expressions
(10) and (11) by  and Λ respectively and make the following logarithmic transformations:  =
log,  =l o gΛ,a n d =l o g.
The employment dynamics equation becomes:
	
 = 
− −  (13)
and the co-state equation:
	
 =  +  − −− + 


1 −  (14)
Before analyzing the stability properties of this pair of diﬀerential equation around the steady
state, it is necessary: ￿rst to prove the existence of the steady state, and second express  as a
function of  and .
4.2 Existence of the Steady State




 =0such that from (10) and (11) it is possible to obtain:
 =  (10￿)
and
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unknowns:








Substituting  and Λ as in (3) and (9) into (10￿) and (11￿) and deriving  from (3), the







 − (1 − )
−1 =  + 
It is clear that the function described by the left hand side of the expression above is monotone:
the ￿rst derivative is negative in the domain of ,w h e n goes to 0 the function goes to in￿nity,
while when  goes to 1 it goes to minus in￿nity. There is only one solution, therefore the steady
state exists and is unique.
4.3 Local Dynamics
After having proved the existence and the uniqueness of the steady state, we have to express the
dynamics around such a steady state. However, we need to express  as a function of  and 
￿rst. In order to succeed in this task we use a log linearized version of the two static equations (3)
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 = e 
 +  +  (16)
where  =l o g , and, e 
 =l o g
.
The expression for  we looked for (demonstration in the appendix) is:
 = 
1 + 






















Substituting the expression for  into (13) and (14) we obtain the system governing the
equilibrium dynamics of the state ()a n dc o - s t a t e( )v a r i a b l e s:
•
 = (1−1)+2+
 −  (21)
•
 =  +  − −− + 
1+2+

1 −  (22)
In looking at the dynamics of the system around the steady state, we linearize equation (21)-
(22):


















where tildes denote deviations from the steady state and the elements of ,a ss h o w ni nt h e
appendix, are represented by:
 =






( +  + )+
1 + 2 
2 +(  +  + )











At this stage of the analysis, it is crucial to check the stability of the system above. Technically,
we must determine the sign of the two roots of the matrix . I np a r t i c u l a ri ft h es t e a d ys t a t e
(
∗ ∗) is completely stable (two negative roots) the equilibrium will be indeterminate. In other
words, all trajectories satisfying (21) and (22), in the neighborhood of (
∗ ∗), converge back to
the steady state. On the other hand, if the two roots are of opposite signs only one trajectory
converges back to the steady state while all the others diverge (saddle path).
The signs of the roots can be derived looking at the trace and the determinant of the matrix
, since they represent the sum and the product of the roots respectively.

 =( 
1 − 1) + 
2 +(  +  + ) ! 0 (24)
" =(  +  + )[ (
1 − 1) − 
2] − 
2
2 (1 + )  0 (25)











 is in the neighborhood of 1, both 
1 and 
2 are close to in￿nity and their eﬀect
dominates in determining the signs of the trace and the determinant. Dealing with the trace ￿rst,
if 



















On the other hand for 





However only in the ￿rst case, when 
1, the determinant is positive, supporting the in-
determinacy hypothesis. Indeed with 
 strictly greater than one all the three elements of the
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!1, the determinant is negative: the two
roots are of opposite sign and the steady state is a saddle point.
The result that increasing returns in matching leads to multiple equilibria and indeterminate
equilibrium paths is not new in the search literature (see for example Diamond, 1982). The
source of such indeterminacy results depends on the positive feedback which works through search
externalities: the increase in the number of potential searching partners makes matching easier.
The positive feedback is that easier search makes matching more pro￿table. In the setting of
the present paper, however, this mechanism works only for speci￿c values of the externalities and
for large increasing returns, not only in the overall matching technology but also for the vacancy
input alone. In details, the parametrization needed to generate indeterminacy in the setting above
implies that the duration of vacancies decrease with their number. Although this implication
could seem unrealistic, it can be supported using the same arguments as those used to justify
the introduction of search externalities in the matching function in section 3. In a world where
labour markets are highly segmented and/or the economy is experiencing either a boom or a bust,
posting a vacancy may determine large external eﬀects, inducing more than proportional variation
in labour supply and therfore a "perverse" implication for the overall matching process. Moreover,
as it will be shown in section7, recent empirical literature does not exclude the possibility of an
elasticity of matching to vacancies greater than one.
5 Decentralized version of the model
In this section of the paper I will show that the results found above can be obtained looking at a
representative household maximization problem. The representative household supplies workers
to other families and receives a wage (#), while, at the same time, it hires workers to run the
family ￿rm, paying a salary to them.
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where  is the labor used in the family ￿rm,  is the labor supplied to the other ￿rms and













1 − ¢ 
1 − 
− 
It is worth noticing that in the two expressions above the probability of ￿lling a vacancy 




a r ec o n s i d e r e da sg i v e nb yt h er e p r e s e n t a t i v e
household.
The present value Hamiltonian of the problem is:
 =l o g
£
 − # + #⁄

















































In order to solve the model we need an expression for the wage rate. As in the standard search
literature, we use a Nash bargaining solution. In other words, in a labour market characterized by
trade frictions, the real wage divides the rent generated by a match between the employee and the
employer, according to a particular weight (%), which represents the worker￿s bargaining power











where the two terms in brackets represent the worker￿s surplus and the producer￿s surplus


























− $ − $ 
1 − 
¶





(1 − %)$ − %$⁄
(35)
However, as shown in the appendix, the last term of the expression above is zero:
%$ =( 1− %)$ (36)
Hence the wage equation (35) becomes:




5.3 Equivalence of the two approaches
The ￿nal step of demonstrating that the pseudo-social planner problem solved in the previous
paragraph is consistent with the decentralized economy presented here, consists in showing that
conditions (9)-(11) can be obtained from conditions (29)-(33).
In particular, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2 If % =  =1−
, then the the pseudo social planner problem can be decentralized
in a competitive equilibrium.
Proof
Assuming $ = Λ
, substituting for # according to (37), and rearranging, condition (32) can
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, expression (39) is identical to (11).
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Again for % = , equation (41) is equal to expression (11).
Moreover, one can notice that the reparametrization of the co-state variable used above, namely
$ = Λ
, is enough to prove the equivalence between (29) and (9). Finally, recognizing that in
equilibrium  =  , 1− =1− and  = , condition (10) can be obtained either from (30)
or (31).
It is worth noticing that the proposition above is the continuous time version of the so-called
Hosios condition8 . The condition can be phrased as follows: when the wage bargaining parameter
(%) is equal to the elasticity of the matching function with respect unemployment (workers search
eﬀort), then the competitive equilibrium is equivalent to the solution of the social planner problem.
In standard models with a constant returns to scale matching function, such a condition means
that negative and positive externalities oﬀset each other and the social planner solution is eﬃcient.
Here the condition is just technical and it has diﬀerent welfare consequences.
In the context of the model presented above, I have demonstrated the equivalence between
the competitive equilibrium and a pseudo social planner problem; where for pseudo social planner
problem I mean a problem solved by a myopic dictator who does not recognize the external eﬀect
of aggregate searching and recruiting activities. Therfore, the solution of the problem does not
represent the ￿rst best and policy intervention may play a role in increasing agents￿ welfare.
8 See Hosios (1990)
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In this section the dynamics of the model above is simulated according to diﬀerent parameter
values. The discount rate parameter () is assumed to be equal to 0'03, while the exogenous
separation rate () is set equal to 0.10.

 = 
  =  1 2 "()
* +
0'70 0'30 −1'7242 1'1084 ,
--
0'65 0'35 −1'4647 0'8539 ,
--
0'60 0'40 −1'2833 0'6720 ,
--
0'55 0'45 −1'1522 0'5358 ,
--
0'50 0'50 −1'0557 0'4297 ,
--
0'45 0'55 −0'9839 0'3443 ,
--
0'40 0'60 −0'9311 0'2732 ,
--
0'35 0'65 −0'8998 0'2240 ,
--
0'30 0'70 −0'8687 0'1593 ,
--
Table 1: Matching function with constant returns to scale
T a b l e3 . 1a b o v er e p o r t st h es i g na n dt h es i z eo ft h em a t r i x roots, assuming a constant returns
to scale matching function (
 = 
 and  = ),f o rd i ﬀerent values of the elasticity parameters. The
￿nal column of the table summarises the implied dynamics of the simulated system (21)-(22). As
in the standard model of search, the solution is a saddle path, i. e. the equilibrium is determinate
and the fundamentals of the economy are able to pin down such an equilibrium.
Table 3.2 below considers the case of increasing returns in matching. In particular, the exter-
nality is assumed to arise from the vacancy side of the matching, while  is assumed to be equal
to .
It is clear that given  =1 , the condition for indeterminacy reduces to 
1.T h et h e o r e t i c a l
results found in the paper are con￿rmed by the simulation: as soon as 
 crosses one, the two roots
become negative, leading to an indeterminate equilibrium. In this case the fundamentals are
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 1 2 "()
* +
0'4 0'6 0'6 −1'2833 0'6720 Saddle
0'4 0'6 0'7 −1'2388 0'7211 Saddle
0'4 0'6 0'8 −1'2964 0'8437 Saddle
0'4 0'6 0'9 −1'5815 1'1756 Saddle
0'4 0'6 0'99 −4'2566 3'8827 Saddle
0'4 0'6 1'01 −0'18395 + 4'0149* −0'18395 − 4'0149* Sink
0'4 0'6 1'05 −0'17836 + 1'75047* −0'17836 − 1'75047* Sink
0'4 0'6 1'1 −0'172149 + 1'20273* −0'172149 − 1'20273* Sink
0'4 0'6 1'2 −0'1618514 + 0'8103* −0'1618514 − 0'8103* Sink
Table 2: Matching function with increasing returns to scale
unable to pin down uniquely the paths towards the steady state once the system is hit by a shock.
Animal spirits may play a role in agents coordination toward one of the in￿nite possible equilibria.
Moreover, the dynamics may be driven not only by real shocks as in the standard RBC models
with search but also by the so called sunspots: agents self-ful￿lling believes. Finally, it is worth
noticing that the roots are complex, meaning richer dynamics. Not only is the persistence of
shocks guaranteed by indeterminacy and the propagation mechanism in￿uenced by search, but
also cycles enrich the propagation mechanism by some features which, in principle, can better
explain employment and unemployment movements in real world.
In order to better understand the propagation mechanism of a unitary shock to the equation
governing the dynamics of labour, I have constructed three diﬀerent impulse response functions
a c c o r d i n gt od i ﬀerent degrees of increasing returns to scale in the matching technology. Assuming
a constant returns to scale case matching function (
 = 
 =0 '6,  =  =0 '4), picture 3 shows
the dynamics of employment once a unitary perturbation has moved  from its equilibrium9 .
The qualitative results are similar to those of Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996). When
search theory is chosen to model the labour market in a general equilibrium model, the frictions
and externalities, operating even under constant returns to scale, prevent an immediate restoration
of the equilibrium: it takes some time before employment returns back to the long-run level. In
other words, employment (and unemployment) displays a certain degree of persistence.
9 Note that  is not perturbated by any shock. Eventually  moves because the indirect in￿uence of labour










Figure 3: Impulse response of equilibrium employment to a unitary shock (constant returns to
scale).
In picture 4 I reproduce the graphical results of a simulation of the model under the assumption
of increasing returns in matching. The curve reproduces the dynamics of labour once, at time
zero, it has been perturbed by a unitary shock. In particular the degree of returns to scale is equal
to 1'5 with 
 =0 '6, 
 =1 '1 and  =  =0 '4.
As one can notice the dynamics of employment is particularly complex. First it displays a sort
of overshooting at the beginning of the time-period. In other words, the eﬀect of the unitary shock
to labour is magni￿ed after it takes place: the curve shows an hump-shaped form. Second, the
dynamics is characterized by cycles around the long-run equilibrium. This is peculiar to models
of indeterminacy in general and to those exhibiting complex roots in particular. At this stage
it is impossible to see clearly which phenomena of actual labour markets can be explained by
this pattern of employment around the steady state. However, employment (and unemployment)
seems to oscillate across time rather than showing an upward or downward linear trend. Third,
the process of returning towards the steady state takes time, reproducing the persistence displayed
dynamics.
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Figure 4: Impulse response of equilibrium employment to a unitary shock. (IRS=1.5)
by unemployment and not captured by standard RBC models in which labour market adjustments
are immediate.
Picture 5 below reproduces the same exercise with a diﬀerent degree of increasing returns
to scale (1.6 instead of 1.5)10 . The qualitative features of this second results are similar to the
previous one: hump-shaped dynamics right after the shock, swings around the long-run equilibrium
and persistent eﬀect of the shock. However, it is worth analysing the quantitative result more in
details. The peack eﬀect of the shock is less pronounced than in the previous case, while the
dynamics is less volatile with smoother and more persistent swings around the equilibrium.
Despite their simplicity, the preliminary and illustrative exercises carried on in the present
section are instructive. First, the increasing returns in the matching function matter for the dy-
namics of employment when the steady state equilibrium is perturbed by a shock. The underlined
10 In this simulation  =0 6,  =1 2 and  =  =0 4.
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ever, whether these features are able to capture real world characteristics should be checked in
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Figure 5: Impulse response of equilibrium employment to a unitary shock (IRS=1.6)
7 Increasing Returns in Matching
Regarding the possibility of empirically plausible increasing returns in matching, in this section I
review several studies devoted to the estimation of the degree of returns to scale in matching. The
key role played by increasing returns in matching is central in the search literature. It goes back
to original ideas expressed by Diamond (1982) and subsequently developed by Howitt and McAfee
(1987) and Howitt (1988). The possibility of ￿fragile equilibria￿11 (instability and indeterminacy)
in a partial equilibrium setting has been extensively analyzed and besides the references above by
Mortensen (1989) and Feve and Langot (1996), who clarify that in a dynamic search model with
11 The concept of fragile equilibria was introduced by Blanchard and Summers (1986)
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in the present paper we have shown that, under some conditions, the same results apply in a
general equilibrium context.
However, while in the partial equilibrium environment increasing returns determine the mul-
tiplicity of equilibria regardless of their degree, in our model size matters. Indeed, proposition 1
says that in order to have a completely stable steady state we need large increasing returns and
with the elasticity of matches to vacancies of at least greater than one. It means that in order to
assess the plausibility of the results found, we must analyze whether the parameters calibration
we have used is empirically supported.
Standard RBC models with search like those of Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) assume
constant returns to scale matching functions. This assumption allows them to solve the model,
using the implied Hosios condition. The empirical support of a constant returns to scale matching
function is found in Pissarides (1996a) and Blanchard and Diamond (1989). However several
empirical investigations have found increasing instead of constant returns to scale. Feve and
Langot (1986), using an international data set including France, Germany and the UK, estimate
quite large increasing returns with the average sum of the matching function elasticities equal to
1'5. Munich et al. (1997) reach similar results for Eastern European countries, while Coles and
Smith (1996), distinguishing between matching and contacts, conclude that the latter display a
high degree of increasing returns in the UK labour market. Anderson and Burgess (2000), instead
of using aggregate US data, analyse state-level data and show that the increasing returns to scale
hypothesis cannot be rejected in most cases. Finally, Warren (1996), using a translog matching
function ￿nds increasing returns close to 1.4.
Although there is wide support for increasing returns, the more stringent condition imposed in
t h em o d e la b o v e( 
1)i sm o r ed i ﬃcult to ￿nd in empirical studies. A value for the elasticity of
matches with respect to vacancies greater than one implies that the duration of a vacancy decreases
as the number of vacancies increases. However, even if this feature can be considered implausible
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expansion when the opening of a vacancy induces more than proportional variations in labour
supply. The same argument, mutatis mutandis, can be applied to periods of severe contraction.
Moreover, in a highly segmented market populated by heterogeneous agents such a convexity of
the matching function with respect to vacancies may well describe sectors or niches of the labour
market.
Nevertheless, my theoretical result is supported by several empirical estimations of the match-
ing function. Gross (1997) estimates the aggregate matching function for Germany over a long
period, ￿nding a value of 
 =1 '267 and  =0 '552 in the period 1972-1983. Finally, Feve and
Langot (1996) ￿s estimations, not only con￿rm degrees of returns to scale similar to the ones used
in our calibration, but also an elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment in the range
of 0'4 − 0'6, while the elasticity of vacancies is always close to one12 .
8 Conclusions
Although the model presented above is rather simple, it is able to produce a series of interesting
results and insights. In particular, using a matching function which incorporates externalities,
displaying increasing returns to scale, and solving a (pseudo) social planner problem, the model is
capable to generate indeterminacy for plausible values in the parameter space. Moreover, such a
result can be derived by looking at a decentralized version of the model in which the representative
household runs a ￿rm hiring workers and at the same time supplies jobs to other ￿rms. In this
case the wage equation is determined outside the maximization problem using a Nash Bargaining
solution.
12 However, they impose the restriction 1 in their estimation.
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future research should focuss on testing empirically the model, deriving an empirical matching
function for the US or EU economy while also performing several simulations according to diﬀerent
parameters value. The closer to real data the results, the more relevant the model will be.
Second, capital should be introduced into the general framework. In particular, the production
function should depend on both capital and labor, while an expression for the dynamics of capital
accumulation should be added. The resulting model would be able to deal with not only sunspots
but also productivity shocks.
Third, the separation rate determining the layoﬀ from employment should be endogenized. In
particular it is my intention to introduce money into the model. One possible way of doing so
could be indeed to make  depend on money. In other words, a ￿rm￿s layoﬀ decisions would be
in￿uenced by monetary shocks.
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(A.6) corresponds to (3.17) in the text, where




















B. The elements of 
Given the following system
	
 = (1−1)+2+
 −  (A.8)
	
 =  +  − −− + 
1+2+

1 −  (A.9)
we de￿ne  as the matrix of the derivatives with respect to  and  of the two diﬀerential
equations above, evaluated at the steady state (∗
∗):
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is it possible to obtain the expression (23) in the text:
 =

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1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C. Condition %$ =( 1− %)$
Lemma 3 For  ∈ (01),i tf o l l o w s :%$ =( 1− %)$
Conditions (4.6) and (4.7) can be rewritten as follows:
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which can be rearranged as:
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